Forty years ago, I worked at The New Yorker magazine, when the offices were still at 28 West 44th Street. Every day I would walk out of Grand Central Station, look up, and see the Chrysler Building’s shining spire. I never got tired of it. The stainless-steel crown reflected the sky differently every day, morning, afternoon, night, rain, snow, shine.
I have profound aphantasia, a complete absence of voluntary visual imagery. Adam Zeman and his co-authors identified the condition and gave it the name in a 2015 paper. A 2022 study suggested about 3.9 percent of people have weak or absent visual imagery, with a complete absence in 0.8 percent. Every year more and more people learn they have it. Eventually about 5-6% of people may be categorized as having aphantasia, equivalent to about half of the left-handed population (~12%), which means that 18 million people in the U.S. appreciate beauty without being able to recall it in their minds. We’re a substantial minority whose experience should matter to any general account of visual beauty.
I only learned I had aphantasia in 2019, after reading a piece by Ed Catmull, co-founder of Pixar, who described having no mind’s eye. By then I had lived in eight major cities: London, Manhattan, Boston, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Denver, Jackson (MS), Baltimore, and the Bay Area (again). I now live in Salt Lake City. I have been looking at buildings and making aesthetic judgments about them for decades, both before and since learning that other people could summon images of buildings up in their heads to appraise them while I cannot.
I can recognize the skyline of every town and city I’ve lived in and can generally remember how to get around when I visit. But I cannot call up the Chrysler Building in my mind. I can recognize it in photographs, of course. Curiously, I recently did not recognize the famed Algonquin Hotel, which was across the street from our offices, though I had lunch there every month or so for two years. It turns out I can recognize the putty-colored Cash Register Building in Denver, which I looked at every day for six years, because I actively don’t like it. It is filed in my mind as “that Denver building I don’t like.” I remember things (people, buildings) that stick out (“that woman in the back with the red sweater who said a smart thing about AI”) but I never remember images alone.
Once you know you have aphantasia, you recognize what your brain does to compensate. I have always remembered images by verbal description. Now I understand why I add words to a memory file when I meet a person or see a building or go to a museum. Having a camera with a phone is a miracle, though not, of course, a substitute.
Lucy Freud, the daughter of the painter Lucian Freud, wrote recently about her own aphantasia and the possibility that her father had it too:
The condition causes you to live in the moment, because you can’t dwell on past memories or imagine things that might happen in the future; your mind can’t form the pictures. So with my dad, I think that meant that when he was with a model, he was fully there. Aphantasia means you don’t get distracted by any other imagery coming in, you focus on what you’re looking at in front of you.
I’ve written about how I read poems as someone without a visual imagination. I’m thinking now about architecture, as beautiful buildings are having a public moment. Or rather, national leaders are calling for more of them.
A year or so ago, in August 2025, an executive order proclaimed classical and traditional architecture would be the preferred styles for federal buildings, with classical as the default style in Washington, DC. These buildings should be “visually identifiable as civic buildings.” Viewers must be able to recognize the building’s public function from its appearance. This would be hard for me, since buildings in the classical style generally do not have words attached, except for elegant carvings, hard to see.
Why classical? Because 72 percent of respondents in a 2020 survey for the National Civic Art Society, shown a series of photographs of buildings, preferred “traditional designs.” To keep the comparison “fair,” the images were selected and edited to control for sky color, light, weather, camera angle, and distance. I have thoughts about this, as someone whose experience in remembering a building is caught up in the fact of seeing it in all kinds of weather. In any case, the 2020 survey sought to remove the variables that contribute to the pleasure of looking, asking respondents to judge the buildings without weather.
What work does a theory of architectural beauty require of the person doing the appreciating? Am I supposed to retain an appearance, assemble different views, summon associations, compare this building with other buildings? How many people do this on a normal day? Some of this may happen without effort or conscious instruction. Still, I’m guessing nobody wants a theory that requires work that millions of people cannot do. I don’t have a theory but here are some propositions toward one.
1. A beautiful encounter should not require recollection.
The essayist Joseph Addison, in 1712, distinguished pleasures arising from objects before our eyes from pleasures arising when visible things are remembered or imaginatively recombined. It’s a good essay; read the whole thing. He assumes a universal capacity to form an “Image in our Fancy”: “we have the Power of retaining, altering and compounding those Images, which we have once received, into all the varieties of Picture and Vision that are most agreeable to the Imagination,” he explains. It does not occur to him that some people might not have this Power.
John Ruskin, in Modern Painters II (1846), demands even more of recollection. He theorizes an “unfailing charm in the memory and anticipation of things beautiful,” sometimes “more sunny and spiritual” than their presence. Actual things can sate and weary us; recollection can omit disagreeable circumstances and combine the pleasing ones. He also assumes visual imagery. After seeing some object, “when we wish for knowledge of its form for immediate use, we summon up a vision or image of the thing; we do not remember it in words.” His account of aesthetic appreciation, which allows the joy of a scene to return without particulars, raises questions of what exactly is retained and whether remembering pleasure requires recovering the specifics of a scene.
My own experience, as I’ve said, is that I can remember loving a building or room or scene while being unable to visualize it at all. Gary Lupyan and colleagues describe hidden differences in phenomenal experience. Two people might give the same account of a beautiful courtyard while one can subsequently enjoy picturing it and the other remembers its arrangement and the feeling of being there. A theory needs to take differences in recall versus pleasure into account.
2. An aesthetic theory should not require the job of picturing.
In “Laocoon: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry” (1766), Gotthold Ephraim Lessing argues that poetry should not try to paint images in the reader’s mind. This is fine with me. With paintings, he says, objects and figures are shown together in space. Poetry presents actions successively, over time. The assumption is that the reader must work to produce the pictures and make them present. It’s a helpful essay for thinking through the medium of beauty. Beauty comes in material forms, not as an abstraction. “All bodies, however, exist not only in space, but also in time. They continue, and, at any moment of their continuance, may assume a different appearance and stand in different relations.” Lessing would not have approved of the 2020 civic architecture poll.
Immanuel Kant, in §26 of the Critique of Judgment (1790), requires the viewer to hold the parts of the building together in a single sensory grasp while still looking at it. You don’t need to recollect it or hold anything in memory. You just have to stand at the right distance: close enough that the parts are distinct, far enough that the eye can run over all of them before the first ones fade. The viewer’s eye should move over the building in sequence. There is of course some burden on the viewer’s imagination to hold in mind what the eye has already passed while it takes in what comes next. There is a burden on the viewer to collapse that sequence into one holistic view, held as sensation rather than as a description. If I scan a building quickly, I can do this. When the building is really really big, it’s hard. But the inability, he suggests, is part of the experience of the sublime. Regarding St. Peter’s:
“The same thing may sufficiently explain the bewilderment or, as it were, perplexity which it is said seizes the spectator on his first entrance into St. Peter’s at Rome. For there is here a feeling of the inadequacy of his imagination for presenting the ideas of a whole, wherein the imagination reaches its maximum, and, in striving to surpass it, sinks back into itself, by which, however, a kind of emotional satisfaction is produced.”
Interestingly, Kant wants people to look at buildings without thinking of the building’s purpose. A pure judgment cannot depend on knowing that the building is a government building or a church or a tomb. For that reason, Kant states that buildings do not allow a pure judgment of the sublime at all.
“We must not exhibit the sublime in products of art (e.g. buildings, pillars, etc.) where human purpose determines the form as well as the size, nor yet in things of nature the concepts of which bring with them a definite purpose (e.g. animals with a known natural destination), but in rude nature (and in this only in so far as it does not bring with it any charm or emotion produced by actual danger) merely as containing magnitude.”
In short, if you know a building has a particular purpose, judgment will be clouded.
Like most viewers I see buildings and spaces successively as a matter of approaching, entering, turning, and moving through rooms. I can remember how rooms connect and judge their proportions while moving through them. Lessing theorizes the “pregnant” moment, suggestive of what came before and what comes after. This is not a particularly intuitive concept for me. But perhaps “pregnancy” is the feeling just before I would ring the doorbell of my old Baltimore neighbor, the late Richard Macksey’s house, before walking into the various rooms that have become famous on the internet.




I spent a great deal of time in Dick’s house as an undergraduate, in the early 1980s, and again as a faculty member after 2006, when I lived a stone’s throw away. Those memories are gone for good. None of the photographs capture that house, those rooms, the smells. I can’t find a photograph of his kitchen, where I helped put the cheese and crackers away after parties, before we settled down to long chats.
3. Remembering an experience and reproducing it are two different things.
I worked for over a decade in the same building as the extraordinarily beautiful George Peabody Library. I spent countless hours there as well but, like everything else, I cannot call it up in my mind. The photographs capture it well in large part because it isn’t “lived in.” It is a beautiful, still place, frozen in time. I can recognize it, describe it in words, and remember the feeling of awe upon entering the room. Twelve years ought to count as some sort of acquaintance with a place. The fact I cannot call up the library means nothing to me but it seems to mean something to others when I mention it. So I appreciate it without recollecting it.
Roger Scruton, in Art and Imagination (1974), distinguishes imagination from imagery; imagining a situation need not involve picturing it. Yet he also suggests that hearing about a friend’s experience might involve “being able to call it to mind.” But his goal is to explain “how the element of thought in aesthetic appreciation may become inseparable from an experience of its object.”
“Imagination is not simply producing descriptions of an object which one is unprepared to assert. It involves thinking of these descriptions as appropriate in some way to the primary object. Imagination is a rational activity. The man who imagines is trying to produce an account of something and is therefore trying to relate his thoughts to their subject-matter: he is constructing a narrative”
Yet while he doesn’t require imagery, he does assert that an image “is always an image of something — imagery has the intentionality characteristic of thought,” which may or may not be true of those of us with aphantasia who sometimes “see” in words. I’ll keep pondering.
Kevin Lynch’s The Image of the City (1960) makes “imageability” a criterion for urban design. He describes the image as a generalized mental picture, yet also as a composite of senses, memories, and meanings, accumulated through interrupted encounters over time. What exactly are city residents being asked to produce in their minds? I can recognize skylines and remember routes without calling up pictures of them. If Lynch’s image means a visible mental picture, there is a problem; if it includes knowledge of spatial relationships and recognition, then picturing is only one possible contribution. A criterion for designing cities should specify what exactly makes a city legible to the people who use it.
4. For some, visual pleasure creates the demand for photographs.
David Hume’s “Of the Standard of Taste” (1757) says that aesthetic taste requires practice and comparison. An important work of art or building should be examined repeatedly and under different conditions; experience of other works improves discrimination. Before anyone can give judgment on any work of importance, Hume says, “that very individual performance” must “be more than once perused…and be surveyed in different lights with attention and deliberation.” You have to practice looking at beauty! “A man, who has had no opportunity of comparing the different kinds of beauty, is indeed totally unqualified to pronounce an opinion with regard to any object presented to him.”
Hume does not require that you recall anything in the imagination. I’ve now lived in ten major cities and have a lot of practice looking at buildings and comparing them, even if I don’t remember any of them, except for the ones I particularly like or dislike (and even then I can’t call them up). He doesn’t theorize comparing images (certainly not photographs) or whether someone can practice by looking at pictures.
Tyler Cowen and Patrick Collison’s “A Call for New Aesthetics” invokes Bauhaus as a movement that helped define an aesthetic for the twentieth century, asking what the aesthetic for a new century should be. Particularly relevant for me is the circulation of images. Walter Gropius opened the Bauhaus manifesto in 1919 with this: “The ultimate aim of all visual arts is the complete building!” The school he founded is remembered as a look, but it began as a program for building, particularly building for daily life. Between 1926 and 1928, during a severe housing shortage, Gropius’s office built 314 row houses at Dessau-Törten, each with a kitchen garden, using serial construction to keep costs down. The residents passed the same white façades and black window frames every day. Over the decades, houses were altered and the estate no longer looks uniform.
In 1932, the Museum of Modern Art hosted Philip Johnson and Henry-Russell Hitchcock’s exhibition of modern architecture, made up of models and photographs showing the new style’s international reach. About 33,000 people saw it in six weeks; it then traveled to eleven more venues, including a Los Angeles department store, and the result was widespread recognition of the name “International Style.” Lewis Mumford, reviewing it in The New Yorker, remarked that the “best buildings in New York” were the models and photographs on MoMA’s walls. Hume might have said yes, perhaps people can learn what modern architecture is from photographs, judging buildings they might never visit, refining their own architectural taste.
5. But a photograph offers only one glimpse of a building
Aesthetic theories have to account for the availability of what the viewer needs beyond a photograph. Does it matter more or less to a person with aphantasia if a beautiful building is demolished? I have lost forever the opportunity to see Dick Macksey’s library; the photographs will never capture my experience and memories.
A 2024 study used software that emulates eye tracking to predict where a viewer’s eyes would go at first glance. Using the same photographs as the 2020 National Civic Art Society poll, it predicted greater initial visual attention to the traditional buildings. The claim is that preference and eye movements are related, that if traditional façades hold the eye and modernist ones don’t, well, that supports the preference. So forget Humean practice. It’s ingrained.
A photograph can offer grounds for a judgment while muddying serious aesthetic theorizing about architectural experience. How does the building look from the approaches people actually use? What happens to its surfaces in ordinary light? What remains interesting after a hundred encounters? What would Hume say really? A person choosing between two photographs and a person who has lived opposite a building for twenty years bring different sensibilities to the question, whether or not one has aphantasia.
6. Duration and time matter for aesthetic theory.
Is a well-proportioned building passed every morning for a decade more or less valuable than a masterpiece of architectural beauty seen once? I don’t know. A masterpiece is intellectually important. An ordinary, well-proportioned building may give more daily pleasure. Duration and placement should be part of an aesthetic theory. The ordinary environment matters, though I know I will forget everyday ugliness as quickly as everyday beauty.
Mette Leonard Høeg, a philosopher and critic with aphantasia, proposes “visual vulnerability” as the name for an unusually intense response to what is in front of her, beautiful or ugly. She considers whether a heightened response to the visible world compensates for missing imagery. I don’t feel this. I have seen my share of ugliness in many of the cities where I’ve lived. I’ve seen ugliness in the country too. I describe it in words.
Colin Ellard, a neuroscientist at Waterloo, took people along East Houston Street in Manhattan wearing skin-conductance sensors, which track physiological arousal. In front of the long, blank façade of a Whole Foods Market, arousal was low and people reported feeling less happy. In front of a nearby strip of small restaurants and stores with open doors, arousal was higher. People walk faster past blank façades.
Some facts: A walker at 5 kilometers an hour moves about 1.4 meters a second and takes about 72 seconds to pass a façade 100 meters long. A driver at 30 miles an hour moves about 13.4 meters a second and covers the same distance in 7.5 seconds, while watching the road. What should a theory of buildings think about how fast a viewer moves past them?
Most encounters with buildings happen from vehicles or from inside the buildings themselves. In 2024, 69.2 percent of American workers drove to work alone, 13.3 percent worked from home, and 3.7 percent took transit. The EPA-sponsored national activity survey, conducted in 1992–1994 and published in 2001, found that respondents spent about 87 percent of their time inside buildings and about 6 percent inside vehicles, leaving less than two hours a day outdoors.
Waymo and self-driving Teslas may turn out to have aesthetic consequences, if the technology allows more looking out the window. Researchers at the University of Michigan’s Transportation Research Institute recommended large windows for self-driving cars to widen passengers’ views and reduce the likelihood of motion sickness. Whether passengers choose to look is another question, but giving up the driving makes attention available for buildings previously passed while concentrating on traffic.
7. A general aesthetic theory must account for appreciation without voluntary pictures.
Edmund Burke proposes in A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757) that words can move readers without supplying a corresponding scene for inspection, as I know well. More generally (as the world knows well with LLMs) language can move readers through processes that do not require a corresponding scene in the mind.
The disagreement between Burke and Lessing, more than two centuries before Zeman’s paper, is helpful to me in filling in the blanks about the place of visualizing in aesthetic theory over the years. Now that aphantasia is beginning to be widely understood, better questions can be asked. When a reader is moved by words without an image, what does this say about the relationship of words, image, feeling, and recollection?
The Scottish Enlightenment essayist Archibald Alison’s Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste (1790) argues that years of reading are required in order to appreciate Rome. Visitors encounter ruins, destruction, and a diminished Tiber, yet experience sublime delight, supplying images of the vanished civilization through reading about Caesar, Cicero, and Virgil. Reading history gives the imagination as “a field of high and solemn imagery.” A visitor to Rome who has not done the reading will not enjoy it, he claims. Given my aphantasia, I agree. But I would not require that of everyone.
Architectural theory should not be a matter of first impressions or having done the reading or the ability to recall or how well a photographer can capture the whole.
Walter Benjamin wrote in 1935 that buildings are the one art people take in by habit, usually without really looking at them. “Architecture has always represented the prototype of a work of art the reception of which is consummated by a collectivity in a state of distraction,” he writes. “Buildings are appropriated in a twofold manner: by use and by perception — or rather, by touch and sight.” A person can be taken in or absorbed by a painting; a building is absorbed by the people who walk past it every day, whether or not they look or recall.
My way of experiencing buildings is perhaps wholly ordinary. I don’t contemplate buildings the way one contemplates paintings. When I look at buildings I am not missing the normal experience of architecture. I look at them and appreciate them in the moment, on my way to work, as most people do.




A text well worth reading, especially for the way it sincerely probes the subject without pretending to have all the answers. Overall, I think, it offers a fresh perspective on the idea that aesthetic theory should shift its focus away from signs and representation and give greater attention to experience and situation. The line that the Bauhaus “is remembered as a look, but it began as a program for building, particularly building for daily life” captures the point perfectly.
Your argument that a photograph cannot substitute for the experience of a building really resonates. We're travelling through Europe documenting modernist architecture, and have repeatedly discovered that buildings we thought we knew from photographs are completely different when experienced physically. Your discussion of the way architectural preference surveys attempt to remove lighting, weather and context is especially revealing. Those aren't distractions from architecture; they're fundamental to how buildings are actually encountered.